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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
SECURITIES FRAUD LITIGATION - CLASS ACTIONS
Korn v. Franchard Corp.
Recently, the Second Circuit again demonstrated its inclination to
permit liberal use of the class action device88 in private securities fraud
litigation. 6 In Korn v. Franchard Corp.s7 the court held that, as a
matter of law, class action status could not be denied in a suit to which
there were at least 70 outstanding parties-plaintiff.8 Finding that alle-
gations of untruths and inaccuracies in the defendant's prospectus pre-
sented common questions of law,89 the court asserted that proceeding
by means of a class action was a superior technique "for the fair and
efficient adjudication of the controversy." 90 Alleging fraud9' in the
claim. See Wilson v. American Chain & Cable Co., 364 F.2d 558 (3d Cir. 1966), discussed
supra note 72.
85 FE. R. Cwv. P. 23.
86 For earlier indications of this inclination, see e.g., Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d
291 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969); Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472
(E.D.N.Y. 1968). The court in Green wrote:
Rule 23 now emphasizes the flexibility which a trial court exercises in the manage-
ment of the action. . . . It is this flexibility which indeed enables us to view
liberally claims which assert a right to a class action in lob-5 cases at the early
stages of the litigation.
Id. at 294. See generally Note, Class Action Treatment of Securities Fraud Suits Under
the Revised Rule 23, 36 GEO. WAsH. L. Rav. 1150 (1968).
Most such litigation, as does most antitrust litigation, arises from private, not gov-
ernmental, initiative. See Ford, The History and Development of Old Rule 23 and the
Development of Amended Rule 23, 32 A.B.A. ANnTRaUsT L. J. 254 (1966).
The Second Circuit's pronouncements in this area are particularly important because
a scanning of the cases indicates that the circuit has a rather large share of the class
action suits involving private securities fraud cases.
87 456 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir. 1972).
88 Id. at 1209.
89 Id. at 1210. The issue of common questions and common reliance is problematic
since different members of the class may have relied in different ways upon the representa-
tions. This was noted by the Advisory Committee on the Proposed Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure in its discussion of Rule 23:
The court is required to find, as a condition of holding that a class action may be
maintained under this subdivision, that the questions common to the class pre-
dominate over the questions affecting individual members.. . . [A] fraud perpe-
trated on numerous persons by the use of similar misrepresentations may be an
appealing situation for a class action, and it may remain so despite the need, if
liability is found, for separate determination of the damages suffered by indi-
viduals within the class. On the other hand, although having some common core,
a fraud case may be unsuited for treatment as a class action if there was material
variation in the representations made or in the kinds or degrees of reliance by the
persons to whom they were addressed.
Notes of the Advisory Committee on the Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure, 39 F.R.D.
98, 103 (1966). See Cannon v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 53 F.R.D. 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)
(mem.) for an implication that oral representations coupled with a uniform written
statement may operate to derogate from the existence of a class.
90 456 F.2d at 1213-14.
91 Plaintiff contended that the prospectus issued by the defendant was tainted by
numerous omissions and misstatements including overvaluation of property; undisclosed
benefits to the seller, a stockholder of appellee Glickman (Glickman was one of the
general partners of 63 Wall Associates); erroneous projections of income; and undisclosed
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issuance of a prospectus by 63 Wall Associates, a firm managed by
defendant Franchard Corporation, the plaintiff sued on her own be-
half92 and on behalf of all other holders of limited partnership interests
in the real estate syndication. District court Judge Mansfield originally
granted plaintiffs' request to allow the case to proceed as a class action, 3
subject to notice94 to potential members of the class by way of notice
of claim forms. 95 This appeal was taken from a revocation of that order
which disallowed the class action.9 6
relationships between appellee Glickman and similar real estate partnerships. The plain-
tiff charged violations of § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a); § 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); SEC Rule lOb-5, and N.Y. Gen.
Bus. Law §§ 352-c, 352-e (McKinney 1968). 406 F.2d at 1207.
92 Plaintiff also sued as executrix of her husband's estate.
93 Korn v. Franchard Corp., 50 F.R.D. 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). See also Eisen v. Carlisle
& Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968).
94 An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding
which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the cir-
cumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford
them an opportunity to present their objections.
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
95 50 F.R.D. at 59. The court felt that the notice of claim procedure would prove
useful in determining the size of the class as well as whether there was common reliance
on the part of class members so as to justify allowance of the class action. For a contrast-
ing view, see Pomerantz, New Developments in Class Actions - Has Their Death Knell
Been Sounded?, 25 Bus. LAw. 1259, 1264 (1970). See generally Comment, The Impact of
Class Actions on Rule 1ob-5, 38 U. Cmr. L. REv. 337 (1971). It has been said that Rule 23
envisions "cooperative ingenuity on the part of counsel and the court in determining the
most suitable notice in each case." Berland v. Mack, 48 F.R.D. 121, 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
96Korn v. Franchard Corp., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. RE..
92,845 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). Over 200 responses to the mailed notice of claim forms were
received. Seventy-seven responses requested exclusion from the class. Of the balance, 80
to 90 percent did not state the approximate amount received upon sale of their units of
the partnership or the particular representations upon which they relied. Only some 70
partners had not accepted checks for the amount of $4,570 for each $5,000 partnership
unit acquired. Based on these data, the district court concluded that there was consider-
able apathy toward the suit. Moreover, Judge Mansfield held that the statements of
reliance which were received did not justify the inference of a "common core" of reliance
and that, therefore, plaintiff's claims would lack the typicality necessary for the main-
tenance of the class suit.
The court of appeals denied a defense motion to dismiss the appeal from the
district court order striking the class action. Korn v. Franchard Corp., 443 F.2d 1301 (2d
Cir. 1971). Appeals to the courts of appeals may generally be taken only from "final
decisions" and defendants contended that the district court order was not such a decision.
(28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970)). However what constitutes a "final" decision is considered a
subjective question (i.e., largely dependent upon the facts of each case), and it has
been held that the concept of "finality" requires "a practical rather than a technical
construction." Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152 (1964). See also
Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-47 (1949).
This is the basis for the "death knell" doctrine, developed by the Second Circuit to
allow appeals from orders denying class suit status. Where such an order would practically
end the plaintiff's chances of pursuing his claim to judgment by making a suit to recover
a relatively diminutive amount of damages unfeasible, the court will permit an appeal
from the order as if it were a final judgment in the action. See Eisen v. Carlisle &-
Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1035 (1967). Where the
plaintiff can continue his action without class status by reason of the significant size of
1972]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Federal Rule 23,17 as revised in 1966,98 serves as the rubric for the
class action device99 and is an exemplar of quasi-statutory judicial
his claim the court will not apply the "death knell" doctrine. See Milberg v. Western
Pacific R.R., 443 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971); Caceres v. International Air Transport Ass'n,
422 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1970); City of New York v. International Pipe & Ceramics Corp.,
410 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1969). See generally Comment, Appealability of a Class Action
Dismissal: The "Death Knell" Doctrine, 39 U. Cm. L. REv. 403 (1972).
97The rule lays down a programmatic formula for the constitution and conduct
of class suits. Thus 23(a) stipulates:
Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or be
sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous
that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or
fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties
are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties
will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
23(b) deals with the maintenance of class actions and provides three sets of conditions
which must be present in order for the class action to be maintainable. 23(b)(3) contains
the set of conditions relevant to securities fraud litigation:
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if
the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition: . . . (3) the
court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the
class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and
that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and ef-
ficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings
include: (A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling
the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any
litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members
of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation
of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered
in the management of a class action.
98 Difficulties encountered in the management of class actions under the old rule
were responsible for the extensive revision which became effective July 1, 1966. The old
Rule 23 read:
(a) Representation. If persons constituting a class are so numerous as to make it
impracticable to bring them all before the court, such of them, one or more,
as will fairly insure the adequate representation of all may, on behalf of all,
sue or be sued, when the character of the right sought to be enforced for or
against the class is(1) joint, or common or secondary in the sense that the owner of a primary
right refuses to enforce that right and a number of the class thereby becomes
entitled to enforce it;
(2) several, and the object of the action is the adjudication of claims which do
or may affect specific property involved in the action; or(3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting the several
rights and a common relief is sought.
Professor James W. Moore who was involved in the drafting of the rule in 1938 wrote
that the tripartite classification of class actions, denominated respectively "true," "hybrid,"
and "spurious," expressed different sets of "jural relations." 2 J. MooRE 23.03, at 2230
(1938). These abstract concepts proved unwieldy and their application often led to
questionable results. See e.g., System Federation No. 91 v. Reed, 180 F.2d 991 (6th Cir.
1950); York v. Guaranty Trust Co., 143 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1944), rev'd on other grounds, 326
U.S. 99 (1945); Knapp v. Bankers Sec. Corp., 17 F.R.D. 245 (E.D. Pa. 1954), aff'd, 230 F.2d 717
(3d Cir. 1956); Wilson v. City of Paducah, 100 F. Supp. 116 (W.D. Ky. 1951).
99 The class or representative suit arose as a device to stave off multiple suits in
situations where common issues of fact or law pertained to many plaintiffs. The class
suit originated in the chancery courts in the form of the bill of peace with multiple
parties. See Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 149-202 (1950). Such a bill was brought
by the lord of a manor to determine whether he had a right of warren and whether the
tenants had .sufficient common. How v. Tenants of Bromsgrove, 23 Eng. Rep. 277 (Ch.
1681). See also Brown v. Vermuden, 22 Eng. Rep. 796 (Ch. 1676). (Dispute between a vicar
[Vol. 47:339
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planning. 0 0 While the rule lays down definitive guidelines for the
and a parishioner concerning payment of tithes in which the vicar sought to enforce a
decree obtained in a suit against all the parishioners where only four defended as a
class and were defeated).
In Sheffield Waterworks Co. v. Yeomans, [1866] L.R. 2 Ch. 8, an English court allowed
a suit by a waterworks company against five persons representing 1500 holders of claim
certificates issued by the company pursuant to a plan to indemnify claimants for damages
caused by the bursting of a dam and the subsequent inundation of an extensive area.
In an early case, a New York court wrote:
It is a general rule in equity that all persons materially interested in the subject
matter of the suit, either as complainants or defendants, ought to be made
parties, in order that a complete decree may be made which will bind the rights
of all, and prevent a useless multiplication of suits. But to this rule there are
many exceptions. It is a rule adopted for the convenient administration of justice,
and is dispensed with when it becomes extremely difficult or inconvenient.
Hallett v. Hallett, 2 Paige Ch. 15, 18 (N.Y. Ch. 1829). Shortly thereafter the same court
wrote:
It is a favorite object of this court to prevent a multiplicity of suits. And where
several persons have a common interest, arising out of the same transaction, al-
though their interest is not joint, even the defendants may sometimes insist that
they shall all be made parties, that he may be only subjected to the trouble and
expense of one litigation.
Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige Ch. 222, 230-31 (N.Y. Chi. 1831).
In Smith v. Swormstedt, the United States Supreme Court allowed a class suit by
six plaintiffs, representing some 1500 preachers of the southern wing of the Methodist
Church, against three defendants representing almost 4000 northern preachers. But the
Court appended a qualification:
In all cases where . . . a few are permitted to sue and defend on behalf of the
many, by representation, care must be taken that persons are brought on the
record fairly representing the interest or right involved, so that it may be fully
and honestly tried.
57 U.S. (16 How.) 307, 322. In Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940), the Court disallowed
a class action based on a judgment in a prior class action because it found that there
was insufficient representation of both present class parties by the would-be class repre-
sentatives in the prior suit.
See Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921), in which the Court
emphasized the binding quality of the class suit judgment:
If the federal courts are to have jurisdiction in class suits to which they are ob-
viously entitled, the decree when rendered must bind all the class properly
represented .... If the decree is to be effective and conflicting judgments are
to be avoided all of the class must be concluded by the decree.
Id. at 367. "Class suits evolved in English equity through necessity." 3B J. MooRa 2302
(1] (2d ed. 1970).
The federal class action received its first crystallized treatment in the RuLps oF
PRACICE IN EQurry:
§ 38. Representatives of Class. When the issue is one of common or general
interest to many persons constituting a class so numerous as to make it im-
practicable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend
for the whole.
226 U.S. 659 (1912).
100 See Notes of the Advisory Committee on the Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure,
39 F.R.D. 98 (1966).
The amended rule describes in more practical terms the occasions for maintain-
ing class actions; provides that all class actions maintained to the end as such
will result in judgments including those whom the court finds to be members of
the class, whether or not the judgment is favorable to the class; and refers to
the measures which can be taken to assure the fair conduct of these actions.
Id. at 99. See generally Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amend-
ments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1), 81 HAuv. L. REv. 556 (1967).
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constitutionl'0 and maintenance 102 of a class suit, it empowers the judge
to issue appropriate orders'03 ensuring the fair and efficient conduct of
the litigation.
In Korn, the court of appeals responded to the issues of the case
by discussing seriatim the various components of class actions prescribed
by Rule 23.104 The court differed with the district court on the ques-
tion of what is a sufficiently large class to merit procedural recogni-
tion. °05 Additionally, the court clarified the criteria to be used in de-
101 See note 100 supra.
102 Id.
103 Under new Rule 28, the court has extensive powers to issue orders during trial
as well as before the constitution of the class. E.g., Korn v. Franchard Corp., 50 F.R.D.
57 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). Rule 23(d) provides:
Orders in Conduct of Actions. In the conduct of actions to which this rule ap-
plies, the court may make appropriate orders: (I) determining the course of
proceedings or prescribing measures to prevent undue repetition or complica-
tion in the presentation of evidence or argument; (2) requiring, for the protec-
tion of the members of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the action,
that notice be given in such manner as the court may direct to some or all of
the members of any step in the action, or of the proposed extent of the judge-
ment, or of the opportunity of members to signify whether they consider the
representation fair and adequate, to intervene and present claims or defenses,
or otherwise to come into the action; (3) imposing conditions on the representa-
tive parties or on intervenors; (4) requiring that the pleadings be amended to
eliminate therefrom allegations as to representation of absent persons, and that
the action proceed accordingly....
In Green v. Wolf Corp., the Second Circuit noted:
To compensate for the increased sweep and gravity of a class judgment, however,
Rule 23 now emphasizes the flexibility which a trial court exercises in the man-
agement of the action. This should serve to focus the attention of the courts
on the need to conduct the litigation without undue complication or repetition.
406 F.2d at 298 (1968). See Brendle v. Smith, 7 F.R.D. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1946). (Court has
wide latitude in the conduct of the action and notice need not be concerned with the
formalities of process. But notice should be flexible and adapted to the requirements
of the case.)
104 456 F.2d at 1209. "[C]lass action is a complicated concept which cannot be ex-
pressed by a simple rule." Comment, 31 ALBANY L. REv. 127, 132 (1967).
But compare the relatively "unsophisticated" class action rule of New York:
Class actions.
(a) When allowed. Where the question is one of a common or general interest
of many persons or where the persons who might be made parties are very
numerous and it may be impracticable to bring them all before the court, one
or more may sue or defend for the benefit of all.
N.Y. Crv. PRAc. § 1005 (McKinney 1962). The federal rule has been suggested as a model
for a revised New York class action procedure. 7B McKinney's CPLR § 1005, supp.
commentary at 67 (1970). See also Homburger, State Class Actions and the Federal Rule,
71 CoLume. L. Rxv. 609, 612-13, 651-52 (1971). For a liberal interpretation of a class action
procedure, see Lichtyger v. Franchard Corp., 18 N.Y.2d 528, 223 N.E.2d 869, 277 N.Y.S.2d
377 (1966). (Limited partners were allowed to maintain a class suit against the general
partners,)
105 Courts differ on this issue as individual preferences of judges may dictate. Thus,
40 plaintiffs have been deemed suffident to constitute a class. Swanson v. American
Consumer Indus. Inc., 415 F.2d 1326 (7th Cir. 1969). See also Hohmann v. Packard In-
strument Co., 399 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1968). Contra, Korn v. Franchard Corp., [1970-1971
transfer Binder] CCH FtD. SEc. L. REP. 92,845 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). (Judge Mansfield held
that 70 plaintiffs could be joined.)
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termining class size by holding the notice provisions of Rule 23106 to
be merely an objective method for uninterested members of the class
to opt out rather than a subjective test of the potential class members'
enthusiasm or regard for a pending suit.07 The superiority of this
pragmatic approach to the equitable determination of class suits is
patent. 0 s The court was satisfied that, insofar as the subject at issue was
the validity of the prospectus, common questions of law or fact were
presented'09 and that varying responses to the notice of claim forms did
not vitiate the typicality of the plaintiff's representative claim.110 Plain-
fiff's change of counsel was found to remove a stumbling block to the
adequacy of the plaintiff's representation of other members of the
class.-"'
o06 FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c).
107406 F.2d at 1209.
The drafters assumed, as we understand it, that many class members might not
be personally enthusiastic about enforcing their rights, but would at the same
time acquiesce in the more galvanic parties becoming the active protagonists.
Id. at 1210. See Epstein v. Weiss, 50 F.R.D. 387 (E.D. La. 1970). See generally Ford,
Federal Rule 23: A Device for Aiding the Small Claimant, 10 B.C. IN. & Com. L. REv.
501 (1969).
108 See Berland v. Mack, 48 F.R.D. 121, 128 (S.D.N.Y. 1969):
[W]e would be naive not to recognize that where (as here) the maximum amount
recoverable on behalf of each of thousands of stockholders would be quite small,
those receiving notice would in all probability not have enough incentive to take
ahy action. If a few decided to "opt out" it would probably be because of fear of
exposure to some kind of liability rather than because they planned to sue
independently.. -
it has been noted that
[t]he type of injury which tends to affect simultaneously the interest of many
people is also apt to involve immensely complex facts and intricate law, and
redress for it is likely to involve expense totally disproportionate to any of the
individual claims.
Kalven & Rosenfeld, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. CT. L. REv.
684 (1941). See also Epslin v. Hirschf, 402 F.2d 94, 101 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 928 (1969),
109456 F.2d at 1210. The sdne 'prospectus applied to all of the investors. The
Supreme Court has ruled that an" action for fraud may be maintained if a defect in a
proxy statement has a ."significant propensity" to affect the voting process. Mills. v.
Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384-85 (1970), rev'g 403 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1968),
rev'g 281 F. Supp. 826 (N.D. Ill. 1967) (emphasis in original).
110456 F.2d at 1210-11. The COirt of Appeals did not find that there was a suf-
ficient showing of lack of reliance on the part of the great multitude of investors.
On the whole, the returned proof-forms reveal a group which is lacking in the
kind of sophistication and knowledge which would assure a meaningful response
so many years later as to the specifics of misrepresentations or omissions, even
assuming that the responrdents understood the questions.
Id. at 1211. See Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 492 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). Cf. Harris v.
Jones, 41 F.R.D. 70 (D. Utah 1966).
111 456 F.2d at 1208. One reason for Judge Mansfield's revocation of the suit's class
status was the misconduct of the plaintiff's attorney in using the court-approved notice
of claim forms to solicit information about another lawsuit. Korn v. Franchard Corp.,
[1970-1971 Transfer Binder]i CCH FED. SEc. L. RFv. 92,845 at 90,167-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
However, the court of appeals found this issue to have been removed from the case
upon the'plaintiff's retention of new counsel. 406 F.2d at 1208 & n.3.
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Adhering to its own decision in Green v. Wolf Corp.,112 the court
of appeals found that common questions predominated over any ques-
tions affecting only individual members of the class."13 Finally the court
stated that the superiority of the class suit as a method of resolving the
issue in question"14 was almost beyond argument." 5
The Korn decision hews to a long line of securities fraud cases
which favors the maintenance of class actions for reasons of equity,
practicality, and reasonableness." 6 The courts are generally conscious
of pitfalls that may arise in the maintenance of class actions and are
willing to overlook defects in order to maintain the plaintiff's cause of
action as a class suit." 7 Thus the Second Circuit developed and applied
What are the ingredients that enable one to be termed 'an adequate representa-
tive of the class?' To be sure, an essential concomitant of adequate representa-
tion is that the party's attorney be qualified, experienced, and generally able to
conduct the proposed litigation.
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 562 (2d Cir. 1968).
112 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969).
"13 456 F.2d at 1212-13.
The line of prior decisions suggests ... that the common questions predominate
where, as here, there is a single written document charged with important omis-
sions. In fraud or lOb-5 cases decided in recent years, various rules, mechanisms,
or presumptions have been put forward for mitigating the problem of showing
reliance....
Id. at 1212. Where the misstatement or omission is found to be material and where there
is a determination of a sufficient causal relationship between the violation and the
injury, the court may justifiably conclude that the violations affected the plaintiff and
other members of the class. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970),
rev'g 403 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1968), rev g 281 F. Supp. 826 (N.D. Ill. 1967); Kahan v.
Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161, 173-74 (3d Cir. 1970).
114 456 F.2d at 1213-14. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
115 Cf. Weiss v. Tenney Corp., 47 F.R.D. 283, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
l6 See e.g., Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161, 168-69 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S.
950 (1970); Swanson v. American Consumer Indus., Inc., 415 F.2d 1326 (7th Cir. 1969);
Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969); Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968); Epstein v. Weiss, 50 F.R.D. 387 (E.D. La.
1970); Weiss v. Tenney Corp., 47 F.R.D. 283 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). In Gaddis v. Wyman, 304
F. Supp. 713 ($.D.N.Y. 1969), the district court allowed a plaintiff. to continue to prosecute
a class suit after the issue in the case had become moot as to the plaintiff herself. The
court held that the mooting of the issue as to the representative did not require dis-
continuance of a class suit since the interests'of many were involved.
117 Thus, the court in Green v. Wolf Corp. wrote:
Wolf contends that the prospectuses differ with respect to various minutiae and
that not all the allegations Green asserts apply to all prospectuses. This may
prove to be true, and the differences alleged may even be relevant to the merits
of Green's case. But the distinctions are too fine to justify denying a class action
at this stage. The district court may use the procedures suggested by Rule 23
to cope with these distinctions, if, indeed, they exist. . . . The very purpose to
be served by a class action is the opportunity it affords to prevent a multiplicity
of suits based on a wrong common to all .... If we were to deny a class action
simply because all of the allegations do not fit together like pieces in a jigsaw
puzzle, we would destroy much of the utility of Rule 23.
406 F.2d at 300.
In Zients v. LaMorte, 459 F.2d 628 (2d Cir. 1972), the Second Circuit reversed a
district court decision denying the claims of five class members who had filed after a set
deadline. Since the notice requirement had been complied with, the district court felt
[Vol. 47:339
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the "death knell" doctrine to keep class suits alive."" "Death knell" was
applied in the instant case when, on defendant's motion to dismiss
plaintiff's appeal from the district court's revocation of class status, the
court of appeals held that the smallness of the plaintiff's claim could
jeopardize the value and advisability of her suit altogether and thus
effectively foreclose relief.11 9 In the instant case, the court found the
issue of the viability of the plaintiff's suit to be "dispositive" of the
question of the "superiority" of the class action.120
The court in Korn evinced an attitude of not allowing the appar-
ent inaction or apathy of other potential class members to thwart the
effectiveness of the class action as a remedial device.' 2 ' But a related
challenge still persists in a subsequent phase of class action procedure
- the lack of a definitive method for computing and distributing judg-
ment proceeds 22 among class members where the smallness of the in-
dividual claims indeed results in apathy on the part of most of the
interested parties. m
One commentator has expressed the problem in the following way:
If the inaction of class members permits retention of the uncol-
lected damages by the defendant, the result may be the effective
exclusion of a substantial number of small claimants from the
benefits of any class action, the dilution of the deterrent effect of a
recovery on behalf of the class, and the unjust enrichment of the
defendant. 24
that it had no discretion to allow the untimely plaintiffs to join in the compromise
claim settlement which had been the subject of the predicate suit. However, the court
of appeals held that, in supervising a settlement fund, a court has the duty to protect
all interested, albeit absent, claimants. See also Zerkle v. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co., 52
F.R.D. 151, 159 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
118Absent considerations of "death knell," orders striking class suits are not ap-
pealable. Korn v. Franchard Corp., 443 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971). For an explanation of
the doctrine, see note 96 supra.
119 The class suit is said to have the "historic mission of taking care of the smaller
guy." Frankel, Amended Rule 23 From a Judge's Point of View, 32 A.B.A. ArrusT L.J.
295, 299 (1966).
120 456 F.2d at 1213-14.
121 The Second Circuit felt that, despite the extensive powers and discretion given
to the district court in relation to class suits, the court was bound to allow rather than
strike the plaintiff's class action status. "In the present circumstances (of the case] .. a
district judge could not decide against allowing a class action without abusing his
discretion." Id. at 1208.
122 If the exact value of the damages cannot be ascertained in a class action situa-
tion, then gross damages should be estimated based upon the defendant corporation's
company records and other documents. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253
(S.D.N.Y. 1971).
123 The possibility that many who should will not share in the class recovery may
be the major issue in a class action and prevent a finding of superiority under sub-
division (b)(3) of Rule 23. See Comment, Damage Distribution in Class Actions: The
Cy-Pres Remedy, 39 U. Cur. L. Rav. 448,449 (1972).
124 Id. at 448. The author develops the intriguing proposal that damage distribution
1972]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Related to the pitfall of damage distribution is the problem of
notice to interested members of the potential class.125 Where a class is
very large,126 the costs of notice may very well determine the ability
of a representative plaintiff to proceed with the suit.'1  Indeed, if notice
is possible' 28 and the plaintiff cannot afford notice, there may be no
alternative to dismissal of the class action.129
to a large class of plaintiffs whose composition cannot be definitively established be by
way of the cy-pres method known to the law of wills. Under a cy-pres approach, damages
would be distributed to the class "next best" to the class presumably suing by repre-
sentation. Distribution of damages would take place via one of three alternative channels:
(I) distribution to all members of the class who come forward to make their claims;
(2) distribution through the state as parens patriae or by escheat; (3) distribution to a
large economic class by way of lowering consumer prices for goods and services produced
by the defendant.
125 See note 96 supra. Adequate notice to potential class members takes on additional
significance under amended Rule 23 since one of the most important changes brought
about is the binding quality of class suit judgments upon all members of the class wh,
have not "opted out." See Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 298 (2d Cir. 1968). Mere
ritualistic notice on the back pages of the local newspaper is insufficient. Eisen v. Carlisle
& Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968). See also Notes of the Advisory Committee on the
Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure, 39 F.R.D. 98, 107 (1966). According to Chafee,
One of the biggest and most neglected problems of class suits is for courts to work
out some kind of machinery to inform unnamed persons in the class about their
predicament.
Z. CHAPEE, SOME PRoBLEms or EQUITY at 231 (1950).
128 Skepticism has been expressed over the viability of a class action in such cir-
cumstances:
What could be less of a class action than a suit where there are more than
3,570,000 potential plaintiffs living in every state of the union and in almost
every country? If this is a class it is so large and indiscriminate that a substantial
proportion of its membership will have no idea whatever that they belong to it.
Just how a notice can be worded which could alert so large a 'class' to the pos.
sibility that proceedings in the Southern District, if carried forward, would
someday enrich each one by a few dollars, if there be anything left after expenses
and attorneys' fees, is a mystery to me.
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 570 (Lumbard, J., dissenting).
127 See Berland v. Mack, 48 F.R.D. 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
To overemphasize the notice requirement would be to stymie the purpose of
the class action device as a means of requiring fiduciaries to toe to the mark.
Id. at 129.
In Berland, the district court attempted to devise a plan to equitably divide the cost
of notice between plaintiff and defendant. The court felt that a rigid rule to tax either
the plaintiff ("death knell" problem) or the defendant (corporate treasury may run the
risk of being depleted by groundless claims) should be eschewed. Rather the court
adopted a flexible approach: if the plaintiff's claim appears meritorious, the defendant
pays; if the plaintiff's claim appears questionable, the plaintiff himself must bear the
initial cost. The court in Berland found that the plaintiff had a prima facie meritorious
claim, that the defendant had an interest in a class action to achieve res judicata, and
that the total cost of the notice was "modest." Consequently, the court ordered the
plaintiff to pay for the mailing of notice and ordered the defendant to furnish a list
of the class members. Any party requesting notice by publication would bear the costs
alone unless both parties so requested. Id. at 130-33.
128FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) requires the "best notice practicable under the circum-
stances" to apprise interested class members. 'Notice is good if it is reasonably certain
of reaching most of those interested. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,
339 U.S. 306, 319 (1950).
129 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 570 (2d Cir. 1968).
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SECOND CIRCUIT NOTE
The instant case is representative of the willingness of the courts
to grant class status in doubtful situations rather than foreclose the
plaintiff from possible relief.13 0 This judicial policy outweighed the
imperfect constitution of the class which the district court thought was
the controlling consideration in the granting of class action status. 81
In Korn, the Second Circuit has reaffirmed the equitable basis of the
representative suit.3 2
DisMIssAL OF DERIVATIVE ACTION - EFFECT ON NON-PARTY
SHAREHOLDERS
Papilsky v. Berndt
The doctrine of res judicata, which accords finality to judgments
where the parties have had their day in court, is perhaps one of the
most firmly established principles of law. In the context of stockholder
derivative actions and other forms of representative suits, unique prob-
lems arise when the strictures of res judicata are applied. The Second
Circuit, in Papilsky v. Berndt,13 3 has carved out a significant exception
in favor of non-party stockholders, to relieve such potential plaintiffs
from the sometimes harsh effects of the res judicata doctrine.
In Papilsky, a stockholder of Affiliated Fund, Inc. brought an action
on behalf of Affiliated, 134 alleging that the defendant officers, directors
130 See Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 928
(1969). The court felt that the "interests of justice" require that, in cases of using the
class action remedy, it is preferable that the court err on the side of allowing the class
action. Class action procedure allows for modification of the preliminary ruling. Id. at 101.
131 See note 96 supra.
132 See Z. CHArmE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQurry (1950) at 292:
However, being much less familiar with class suits, judges do not yet know quite
how to go about it. They are inclined to treat the representative suit as an
ordinary adversary proceeding and to forget the unnamed persons, leaving them
to the tender mercies of the parties in court. Instead the judge ought to think of
these outsiders as somewhat like wards of the court, at least until he is sure that
the representatives are stout fellows who are fighting vigorously for the entire
class.
133 466 F.2d 251 (2d Cir. 1972).
134 The nature of a shareholder's derivative action is such that he is allowed to
enforce the corporation's claim against the directors or officers who have been guilty of
mismanagement. He has no right to sue and recover damages on his own behalf. He
does benefit indirectly, however, as any recovery becomes part of the corporate assets
in which he, of course, shares.
See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970) where the Court said, in dictum, that no
action existed at common law by which a stockholder could make a corporate director
account for his wrongs. Equity made available a remedy in the form of a derivative suit
"to enforce a corporate cause of action against officers, directors, and third parties ...
[O~ne precondition for the suit was a valid claim on which the corporation could have
sued; another was that the corporation itself had refused to proceed after suitable
demand .... Thus the dual nature of the stockholder's action: first, the plaintiff's right
to sue on behalf of the corporation and, second, the merits of the corporation's claim
itself." Id. at 534-35. In Kauffman v. Dreyfus Fund, Inc., 434 F.2d 727 (3d Cir. 1970),
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